TY - JOUR
T1 - A brave new world? Kantian-Nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation
AU - Grafton, Quentin
AU - Kompas, Thomas
AU - Long, Ngo Van
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - We model game-theoretic situations in which agents motivated by Kantian ethics interact with conventional Nashian agents. We define the concept of generalized Kant-Nash equilibrium which encompasses the Nash equilibrium, the Kantian equilibrium and the Kant-Nash equilibrium as special cases. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Kant-Nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation, and derive its properties. In a dynamic setting, we analyze a differential game of climate change mitigation in the presence of both types of agents, and compare their Markov emission strategies. For both the static model and the dynamic model, as the population share of Kantians increases, the quality of the environment improves, and both types of agents are better off
AB - We model game-theoretic situations in which agents motivated by Kantian ethics interact with conventional Nashian agents. We define the concept of generalized Kant-Nash equilibrium which encompasses the Nash equilibrium, the Kantian equilibrium and the Kant-Nash equilibrium as special cases. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Kant-Nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation, and derive its properties. In a dynamic setting, we analyze a differential game of climate change mitigation in the presence of both types of agents, and compare their Markov emission strategies. For both the static model and the dynamic model, as the population share of Kantians increases, the quality of the environment improves, and both types of agents are better off
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.04.002
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.04.002
M3 - Article
SN - 0014-2921
SP - 1
EP - 12
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
IS - Online
ER -