Adaptation in the Field: The British Army's Difficult Campaign in Iraq

Daniel Marston

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    British operations leading the Multi-National Division Iraq (South East) (MND (SE)) Iraq were expected by many to be highly successful due to the British Army's long and distinguished history of successfully prosecuting counterinsurgencies around the globe. However, complacency and hubris, coupled with an inadequate understanding of the mission facing MND (SE) foiled British attempts to achieve success. It was only through a 'bottom-up' revision of the British Army's efforts, led by junior and mid-ranking officers, that significant reforms were made. These helped the British Army increase its effectiveness in line with US efforts, and allowed them to begin handing over control for security to their Iraqi counterparts.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)71-84
    JournalSecurity Challenges
    Volume6
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - 2010

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