Building legitimacy and state capacity in protracted fragility: The case of Afghanistan

    Research output: Book/ReportCommissioned report


    In late 2001, Afghanistan had a failed state, weak and fragmented, and unable to provide either effective services or protection to its citizens. The economy had contracted due to more than two decades of war. The World Bank in 2002, estimated the total cost over the period of conflict, measured in terms of lost growth and the cost of humanitarian assistance as well as military expenditure, to be $240 billion.1 More than two-thirds of the population were either displaced or took refuge outside Afghanistan, especially in Iran and Pakistan. A war economy had emerged which transformed the socio-economic dynamic of the country making post-2001 recovery and state-building a daunting task.
    Original languageEnglish
    Commissioning bodyThe LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development
    Publication statusPublished - 2018

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