TY - JOUR
T1 - Convergence and divergence in dynamic voting with inequality
AU - Di Guilmi, Corrado
AU - Galanis, Giorgos
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - We test whether the original median voter theorem's result of political convergence in a two-party system holds when the control variables that influence voters’ preferences endogenously evolve over time and parties are policy motivated. We present a dynamic voting model in which voters’ heterogeneous preferences evolve over time depending on observable common factors and unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics. In such a setting, the convergence of parties’ platforms to the centre is a special case within a range of results that include instability and extreme equilibria. In particular, convergence is achieved not as the result of electoral strategies, but when neither party has enough support to pursue its agenda.
AB - We test whether the original median voter theorem's result of political convergence in a two-party system holds when the control variables that influence voters’ preferences endogenously evolve over time and parties are policy motivated. We present a dynamic voting model in which voters’ heterogeneous preferences evolve over time depending on observable common factors and unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics. In such a setting, the convergence of parties’ platforms to the centre is a special case within a range of results that include instability and extreme equilibria. In particular, convergence is achieved not as the result of electoral strategies, but when neither party has enough support to pursue its agenda.
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.013
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.013
M3 - Article
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 187
SP - 137
EP - 158
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -