Dealing with Time-Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting vs. Exchange Rate Targeting

J. Scott Davis, Ippei Fujiwara, Jiao Wang

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Abandoning an objective function with multiple targets and adopting single mandate can be an effective way for a central bank to overcome the classic time-inconsistency problem. We show that the choice of a particular single mandate depends on an economy’s level of trade openness and the credibility of the central bank. We begin with reduced form empirical results which show that as central banks become less credible they are more likely to adopt a pegged exchange rate, and crucially, the tendency to peg depends on trade openness. Then in a model where the central bank displays “loose commitment” we show that as central bank credibility falls, they are more likely to adopt either an inflation target or a pegged exchange rate. A relatively closed economy would adopt an inflation target to overcome the time-inconsistency problem, but a highly open economy would prefer an exchange rate peg.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1369-1399
    JournalJournal of Money, Credit and Banking
    Volume50
    Issue number7
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Dealing with Time-Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting vs. Exchange Rate Targeting'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this