Debt maturity structure with pre-emptive creditors

Prasanna Gai; Hyun Song Shin

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.031

Debt maturity structure with pre-emptive creditors

Prasanna Gai, Hyun Song Shin

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

Critics of international solvency regimes argue that such regimes heighten financial fragility because creditors pre-empt each other by lending at ever shorter maturities in a 'rush for the exits'. We model such behaviour explicitly in order to examine the effects of workouts on the maturity profile of debt.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	195-200
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	85
Issue number	2004
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.031
Publication status	Published - 2004

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10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.031

http://hdl.handle.net/1885/87224

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title = "Debt maturity structure with pre-emptive creditors",

abstract = "Critics of international solvency regimes argue that such regimes heighten financial fragility because creditors pre-empt each other by lending at ever shorter maturities in a 'rush for the exits'. We model such behaviour explicitly in order to examine the effects of workouts on the maturity profile of debt.",

author = "Prasanna Gai and Shin, {Hyun Song}",

year = "2004",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.031",

language = "English",

volume = "85",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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T1 - Debt maturity structure with pre-emptive creditors

AU - Gai, Prasanna

AU - Shin, Hyun Song

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - Critics of international solvency regimes argue that such regimes heighten financial fragility because creditors pre-empt each other by lending at ever shorter maturities in a 'rush for the exits'. We model such behaviour explicitly in order to examine the effects of workouts on the maturity profile of debt.

AB - Critics of international solvency regimes argue that such regimes heighten financial fragility because creditors pre-empt each other by lending at ever shorter maturities in a 'rush for the exits'. We model such behaviour explicitly in order to examine the effects of workouts on the maturity profile of debt.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.031

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.031

M3 - Article

VL - 85

SP - 195

EP - 200

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 2004

ER -

Debt maturity structure with pre-emptive creditors

Abstract

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