Decomposition of Valence and Paradox of Primary Election

Norman Abjorensen, Yusaku Horiuchi, Megumu Sato

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper


    When does a political party decide to hold a primary election to choose a candidate for the next election, and when does an incumbent decide to announce his/her political retirement? Furthermore, if they make decisions interactively, how do their decisions affect the quality - "valence" - of the candidate who ends up running for the party? In this paper, we examine these questions by modeling a simple strategic game between a party and an incumbent in the context of Australia where political parties take important roles in selecting candidates and making policies. Specifically, by decomposing the valence into three factors, we show that primary elections may facilitate (potentially) high-quality incumbents to retire unexpectedly. We call it a "paradox of primary elect
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication statusPublished - 2011
    EventAustralasian Political Studies Association Conference (APSA 2011) - Canberra Australia
    Duration: 1 Jan 2011 → …


    ConferenceAustralasian Political Studies Association Conference (APSA 2011)
    Period1/01/11 → …


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