Ending the War in Aceh: Leadership, patronage and autonomy in Yudhoyono's Indonesia

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    This chapter explains the reasons behind the unexpectedly smooth peace process in Aceh. It begins with an analytical description of the decades-long conflict and the several failed attempts at its resolution, outlining both the separatist ideology of the rebels and the unitarian determination of the Jakarta Government to keep the Indonesian state together. In 1949, the Dutch eventually surrendered their executive authority over the Netherlands East Indies to the United States of Indonesia – a federal state which included the Republic and several other territories. The military campaign in 2003 and 2004 forced Gerakan Aceh Merdeka onto the defensive, and triggered discussions within the rebel group about the need to revise its agenda and strategy. In recent years, scholars of autonomy regimes in heterogeneous states have engaged in extensive debates on whether concessions by the central government to peripheral regions have a moderating or aggravating effect on secessionist sentiments in such areas.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationAutonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia
    Editors Rajat Ganguly
    Place of PublicationAbingdon
    PublisherRoutledge, Taylor & Francis Group
    Pages88-113
    ISBN (Print)9780415570169
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012

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