Enforcement and over-compliance

Jay Shimshack, Michael Ward

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Economists generally view environmental enforcement as a tool to secure compliance with regulations. This paper demonstrates that credible enforcement significantly increases statutory over-compliance with regulations as well. We find that many plants with discharges typically below legally permitted levels reduce discharges further when regulators issue fines, even on other plants. Also, non-compliant plants often respond to sanctions by reducing discharges well beyond reductions required by law. Thus, increased enforcement generates substantial discharge reductions above and beyond those expected from simply deterring violations.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)90-105
    JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
    Volume55
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2008

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Enforcement and over-compliance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this