Abstract
The area of counter-terrorism (CT) is littered with mistakes, be these high-profile mistakes which have dire consequences (the fatal shooting of John Charles de Menezes) or more mundane errors (such as incorrect
detention/questioning of those suspected of terrorism). In this chapter,
we seek to disaggregate the mistakes, errors and miscalculations around
counter-terrorism policy. We begin by noting the particular difficulties and complications in assessing when ‘something goes wrong’ in terms of counter-terrorism. There are particular issues around uncertainty in terms of counter-terrorism. This uncertainty gives precautionary logics a prominent place in counter-terrorism, such that the absence of knowledge about
terrorist attacks is often seen as no barrier to pursuing counter-terrorism
measures. In such a situation of uncertainty, does the absence of a terrorist attack mean that counter-terrorism has successfully averted an attack? Or was an attack not likely/never planned? How do we calculate the impacts, or costs and benefits, of counter-terrorism in more subjective terms?
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Political Mistakes and Policy Failures in International Relations |
Editors | Andreas Kruck, Kai Oppermann, Alexander Spencer |
Place of Publication | Switzerland |
Publisher | Springer Nature |
Pages | 33-53 |
Edition | 1 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-319-68173-3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |