NORTH KOREA, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND NO GOOD OPTIONS?

How would the capability to target the United States with nuclear missiles infl uence North Korean foreign policy? Pyongyang’s fi fth nuclear test in September 2016 and series of long- range and intermediate- range missile tests leave little doubt that the regime’s ultimate goal is the capability to reliably target the United States with nuclear weapons. If—a better word is probably when—Kim realizes this capability, what might the United States, South Korea, and the regional community do to prevent the most dangerous outcomes and encourage safe or at least less dangerous ones? I address these questions here. I argue that Kim Jong- un and his associates’ personal experience of fear of imminent nuclear war in a nuclear crisis and beliefs about how much control they have over nuclear escalation—if Pyongyang develops the aforementioned capability—will determine whether nuclear war ultimately erupts on the Korean Peninsula.