Rule of Law in Fragile Places: the Securitization Challenge

We have a vast and growing literature on justice reform in the many countries that are classifi ed as fragile, confl ict-aff ected or post-confl ict. In cases such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Southern Sudan and the Solomon Islands this is partly because what began as a security intervention morphed into a decade-long engagement with state-building and development. Individual legal scholars have produced interesting case studies that highlight the limitations of conventional rule of law paradigms in fragile and confl ict aff ected states （FCSs） （e.g. Shimada, 2009; Monson, 2011; Dinnen and Allen, 2012; Taylor and Bosch, forthcoming） . Yet much legal scholarship remains disconnected from the new prominence of FCSs, the rise of security sector reform （SSR） programming, and the World Bankʼs thesis regarding cycles of violence （WDR 2011）3）. The WDR 2011 suggests a double paradox: currently we have multiple discourses of justice reform, including law and/in development, emphasizing equitable economic growth and ʻrule of lawʼ for state building and/or peace building. Both emphasize legal ʻinstitutionbuildingʼ that is often formalist and state-oriented; yet FCSs are self-evidently diff erent from the economies for which this prescription was developed. We seem to be tracking old, fl awed donor modalities of action in new, more complex settings. This article explores how these concepts are embedded in programming documents developed by key international actors （bilateral and multilateral donors）, particularly as they relate to fragile and confl ict aff ected states, and how they have shifted in response to the challenge of FCS settings. It identifi es one key challenge from the domain of practice of security sector reform （SSR）: the way in which SSR seeks to reshape conceptions of ʻjusticeʼ （see generally, Sedra, 2010）.