This chapter explores the possible impact of new disarmament momentum on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea (also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [dprk]) and Iran. Both states regularly engage in nuclear defi ance: openly refusing to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) Board of Governors and United Nations (un) Security Council resolutions passed in response to their safeguards violations; and failing to negotiate in good faith in nonproliferation and disarmament negotiations, whether they take place within the un purview (multilateral negotiations) or via ad hoc arrangements (bilateral or plurilateral talks). This belligerent approach to nuclear diplomacy, which is distinct from the quieter nuclear activities of Myanmar and Syria, is notable because it represents a loud and sustained rejection of international law and of expectations of appropriate behavior and thus results in an escalation of international tensions. It goes beyond nuclear noncompliance-which can be detected or undetected, intentional or unintentional, major or minor-and moves into the realm of deliberate, overt, repeated abuse of international law and norms. The core issue this chapter addresses is this: Can international disarmament impetus foster conditions that are likely to encourage North Korea and Iran to "dial down" their defi ance and engage in more cooperative behavior, such as allowing greater transparency, engaging in constructive negotiations, and consistently following through on disarmament and nonproliferation commitments? Or is it just as likely, or possibly even more likely, to contribute-directly or indirectly-to conditions that result in escalation?
|Title of host publication||Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century|
|Editors||Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro|
|Place of Publication||Athens, GA, USA|
|Publisher||University of Georgia Press|
|Publication status||Published - 2012|