The Economics of Allocation in Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

Quentin Grafton, Rognvaldur Hannesson, Bruce Shallard, Daryl Sykes, Joseph Terry

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    The paper reviews existing allocation mechanisms in the five tuna regional fisheries management organizatins and shows that although they have adopted different approaches all have failed to prevent overcapacity and, or some stocks, overexploitation. As an alternative, it is proposed that each tuna regional fishing management organization establish total allowable catches by species and area, and then allocate non-transferable and permanent country shares (as a proportion of the total harvest) to member countries. Each country would be free to use or sell its annual allocation of fish that would be determined by the permanent country shares, but the sales could only be to fellow member countries. A two-tier allocation to countries of permanenet shares of a total allowable catch, and then annual harvest allocations to vessels of member countries, offers the promise of mitigating, and possibly overcoming, the twin problems of overcapacity and overexploitation in the highly migratory and high seas tuna fisheries.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationConservation and Management of Transnational Tuna Fisheries
    Editors Robin Allen, James A Joseph & Dale Squires
    Place of PublicationAmes, Iowa, USA
    PublisherWiley-Blackwell
    Pages155-162
    Edition1st
    ISBN (Print)9780813805672
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2010

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