|Title of host publication||Handbook on the Politics of Public Administration|
|Editors||Andreas Ladner, Fritz Sager|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Publisher||Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.|
|Publication status||Published - 2022|
How much politics goes into the development, implementation, evaluation, and reform of regulation? This question has been at the forefront of regulatory scholarship for over five decades (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971; Wilson 1980). As in many areas of public administration, the responses to that question can be crudely summarized by: ● answers from ‘traditional’ Chicago School economics from the 1970s and 1980s: the politics of regulation characterized by an economic cost–benefit rationale and pursued by rational beneficiaries and opponents of regulation; ● answers from New Public Management (NPM) from the 1990s and early 2000s: the politics of regulation characterized by a need to shift the role of government to ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’, and to allow for more (free) market solutions to complex problems; and ● answers from (new public) governance scholarship from the late 2000s and 2010s: the politics of regulation characterized by a renewed interest in (and appreciation of) the role of government in addressing complex societal problems (such as climate change, global inequality, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution) and a more realistic (i.e., less rational) model of human behaviour.